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Chapter 7
The Taxation of Private Pensions
Andrew Dilnot
As governments throughout the developed world faced up to growing
pressure on public finances in the 1980s and 1990s, one natural question
has been whether more tax could be raised from the pension sector.
Alongside the desire to raise more revenue, there have been some tax
reformers who have called for a broader tax base and lower tax rates,
while others have argued for special tax privileges in an attempt to boost
saving. Contributions to private pensions represent a major part of pri-
vate sector savings flows, and thus their taxation must fit sensibly with the
taxation of other forms of saving. Where private pensions are based on
funds. as is typically true within the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), the pension funds are of enormous
importance as suppliers of capital to industry; any taxation must aim
to avoid distorting the capital market. And, finally, private pensions are
an important and growing source of retirement income. The taxation
of pension benefits should aim to distort choices as little as possible for
the retired, and in particular should not necessarily distort the decision
as to the mix of benefits to be taken between lump sum and pension. All
these are complex issues; the aim of this chapter is to attempt to highlight
areas where discussion and debate are needed rather than to define
answers.
We begin by examining the range of possible tax regimes in which
private pensions might operate. Next we describe the tax systems for
private pensions in a number of countries, and consider alternative aims
for a tax system as it affects retirement saving. Possible routes to raising
additional revenue from private pensions for those countries at present
giving substantial relief are evaluated along with the debate over tax
expendi tures.
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Taxing the Provision of Private Pensions
Three main transactions constitute most private pension plans, and it is
these transactions that are the possible occasions for taxation:
• Contributions into the scheme, from employer or employee
• Income derived from the investment of contributions
• Payment of retirement benefits from the accumulated fund.
As we discuss in the following section, there are examples within the
OECD of regimes that tax pensions at almost every conceivable combina-
tion of these points. However, certain possible combinations are more
common than others, and certain combinations characterize alternative
ideals for the tax system.
Table 1 illustrates four possible tax regimes, describing them in terms
of whether tax is imposed at each of the three possible points. Thus the
EET regime is exempt taxed. We assume for these examples that there is
a single income tax rate of 25 percent, that the rate of return that can
be earned on investment is 10 percent, and that we are considering a
single contribution derived from earned income of 100, five years before
retirement.
Regime A: Tax Free Contributions and Fund Income, Taxed Benefits (EET)
This regime allows deductibility of pension contributions from taxable
income, allowing the whole 100 ofearnings into the pension fund. No tax
is charged on the investment income of the fund, but tax is charged in
full on withdrawal. This type of tax treatment confers a post-tax rate of
return on saving equal to the pre-tax rate of return. Faced with this
regime an individual earning 100 can either choose to spend now, paying
25 of tax and consuming goods worth 75, or save now and consume goods
worth 120.79 in five years. The figure 120.79 is simply 75 X (1.1)5. It is
easy to think of this regime as being a way of deferring pay until retire-
ment, and simultaneously deferring the payment of tax on that pay until
retir'ement.
RegU/le B: Taxed Contributions, Tax Free Fund Income and Benefits (TEE)
This regime does not allow deductibility of contributions, thus reduc-
ing the initial size of the fund from 100 to 75. As for Regime A, investment
income'is free of tax. Withdrawal ofretirement benefits attracts no tax. As
for Regime A, this type of tax treatment preserves the equality of pre- and
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TABLE 1 Alternative Tax Regimes
A B C D
Characteristic (EEl) (TEE) (TTE) (ETT)
Earnings 100 100 100 100
Taxes Paid 25 25
Pension Fund 100 75 75 100
Net Income Over Five Years 61.05 45.79 32.67 43.56
Fund at Retirement 161.05 120.79 107.67 143.56
Tax on Withdrawal 40.26 35.89
Benefit Withdrawn 120.79 120.79 107.67
Source: Author's simulation.
post-tax rates ofreturn. In the case of Regime B it is easy to see the non-
taxation of investment income that ensures this.
Regime C: Taxed Contributions, Taxed Fund Income, Tax-Free Benefits (ITE)
This regime is basically that applied to interest-bearing short-term sav-
ing in most OECD countries. There is no tax deductibility of contribu-
tions, investment income is taxed in full, and there is no tax on with-
drawal of benefits, since there is no untaxed investment income. Unlike
Regimes A and B, this tax treatment brings the post-tax rate of return
below the pre-tax rate of return. Here, the post-tax rate of return is 7.5
percent [107.67 = 75 X (1.075)5].
Regime D: Tax Free Contributions, Taxed Fund Income, Taxed Benefits (EIT)
This regime produces the same outcome as C, and therefore the same
post-tax rate of return. Taxation of benefits and exemption of contri-
butions is substituted for taxation of contributions and exemption of
benefits.
Other combinations of taxing and relieving at each of the three points
are possible, and indeed exist. There are no regimes within the OECD
less favorable than C, but many more favorable than A or B.
If taxing pensions were as simple as implied by the above examples,
much of the complexity of both legislation and of the pensions industry
itself would be unnecessary. We discuss below some of the problems
associated with attempting to increase revenue in this area that are re-
lated to the complexity of pension regimes in practice. We have, for ex-
ample, assumed that contributions can be identified. Non-<ontributory
employer-funded schemes make this quite difficult. We have assumed
that funds exist, although there are many examples ofunfunded schemes
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and, in some countries, ofeffectively pay-as-you-go schemes. We have also
ignored the problems of identifYing investment income, in particular
where the income is in the form of unrealized capital gains, and of al-
locating investment income to individuals in a fund held on behalf of
individuals with varying marginal tax rates.
Finally, and perhaps most important, we have ignored inflation. For
Regimes A and B, which do not tax investment income, inflation causes
no problem; for Regimes C and D, where investment income is taxed, dif-
ficulties arise. If investment income is taxed ignoring inflation, the post-
tax real return will fall still further below the pre-tax real return. Imagine
that in our earlier examples 7.5 percent of the 10 percent interest rate
simply reflects inflation. To maintain the real value of savings a 7.5 per-
cent post-tax rate of return is required. The outcome ofRegimes C and D
was 107.67, which is precisely 75 X (1.075)5. So Regimes C and D, if they
ignore inflation, would in this case remove the whole of the real return. If
the balance between inflation and real returns were to shift further to-
wards inflation, Regimes C and D would confer a negative post-tax rate of
return. Regimes A and B retain their characteristic of real pre- and post-
tax real rates ofreturn whatever the mix ofinflation and real return in the
nominal return. In the case of 7.5 percent inflation the real return in
Regimes A and B is 2.32 percent per year, equal to the pre-tax real return
(1.075 X 1.0232 = 1.10). Regimes of type A and B correspond to an
expenditure tax-type treatment, while Regimes C and D correspond to a
comprehensive income tax type treatment. 1 These brief descriptions of
possible tax regimes should provide some benchmarks against which to
assess the actual regimes summarized in the next section, and to provide a
basis for our discussion of the criteria for a "good" tax system for private
pensions.
Taxing Pensions
Our discussion thus far has outlined a range of possible regimes for
taxing private pensions. In this section we describe briefly some actual
regimes, and attempt to relate them to the hypothetical regimes just
presented. Table 2 is inevitably a simplification.
Almost all the countries shown impose upper limits on the level of
contribution and!or benefits that can be paid, although typically these
limits affect only a small proportion of the workforce. Many countries
treat lump sum payments out of pension funds more generally for tax
purpos,es than they do regular payments: Australia, Ireland,Japan, and
the United Kingdom fall into this category. Some other countries such as
Canada arid France take quite the opposite route, disallowing lump sum
payments out of tax-privileged pension regimes, while the remainder
Andrew Dllnot 217
TABU 2 Taxation of Private Pensions
Country Contributions Fund Income Benefits Regime
Australia Employer deduct tax at 15% partially ?
Employee partially taxed
deduct
Canada Deduct exempt taxable EET
France Deduct nla taxable EET?
Germany Employer deduct exempt taxable EET?
Employee taxed
Ireland Deduct exempt taxable EET
Japan Employer deduct low tax rate taxable ?
Employee rare
New Zealand Taxable taxable exempt TIE
Denmark Deduct taxed on real taxed ETI?
returns
Greece Deduct exempt taxed EET?
Netherlands Deduct exempt taxed EET
Portugal Employer deduct exempt taxed EET?
Employee limited
deductibility
Sweden Deduct tax at 10 to taxed ETI?
15%
United Kingdom Deduct exempt taxable EET
United States Employer deduct exempt taxable EET
Employee taxable
Source: Author's compilation.
subject lump sums to tax in broadly the same way as regular payments. It
is clear from Table 2 that the bulk of countries still operate systems most
like the EET regime referred to above, which itself corresponds quite
closely to the expenditure tax, and can also be thought of as a system of
deferred pay. These apparently quite generous schemes have typically
operated over quite lengthy periods.
It is worth noting that two countries that have recently reformed their
taxation of pensions, Australia and New Zealand, have both moved to-
ward less generous systems, at least partly with the aim of raising extra
revenue but also with the aim of improving the efficiency and equity of
the tax system as a whole. New Zealand has taken perhaps the boldest
steps, making all contributions taxable, taxing all fund income (with no
allowance for inflation), and then leaving all pensions untaxed. As ar-
gued at the time in New Zealand, this puts pension saving on the same
basis as saving in an ordinary interest-bearing account.
The reforms in Australia moved in a similar direction, but have pro-
duced a substantially more complex system. Employer contributions con-
tinue to be deductible. Employee contributions are partially deductible
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up to certain limits contingent on employer support being below a given
level, and all concessions are phased out beyond roughly average earn-
ings. These limits discourage employers from increasing their contribu-
tions beyond the level at which employees lose their rights to deduct-
ibility and create a number of other distortions. Contributions that have
been deductible are subject to a 15 percent withholding tax. Investment
income of the fund is taxed at 15 percent, as are capital gains, but capital
gains are taxed after adjustment for inflation, thus making capital gains
far more attractive than income from the point of view of the funds.
Lump sum benefits are taxed at 15 percent beyond a threshold, and pen-
sion benefits are taxed at the individual's marginal rate less 15 percent.
Two other regimes deserve special mention since they do not fit into
the framework outlined above-those of France and Germany. Occupa-
tional pensions are provided in France through a pay-as-you-go system
known as "repartition." Employers make contributions to a collective
pension plan; these earn a certain number of points for the employee on
whose behalf they are made. At retirement the worker concerned will
have a points score to his or her credit that determines the pension to be
received. The value of a pension point is reviewed annually and moves in
line with earnings. The cost of a pension point is set by the annual out-
flow from the fund. Thus there is no funding of future liabilities, and
hence no pension fund assets or liabilities ofgreat significance. Contribu-
tions made by employers on this basis are deductible against corporation
tax paid by employers, and employee contributions can be deducted
from taxable income. Pensions are taxable as ordinary income, although
subject to some special concessions.
The normal method of private pension finance in Germany is through
the use of "book reserve" accounting. There is no special fund; prospec-
tive pension liabilities are charged each year against the company's profit
and loss account and balance sheet. Charges computed in accordance
with bases agreed on by the tax authorities can be deducted in assessing
corporation tax liabilities. Scheme members rank with other creditors in
the event of insolvency of the parent company; hence legislation requires
that vested benefits and pensions in payment should be insured. Pre-
miums for such insurance are in turn tax-deductible. There is no charge
to employees until pensions are paid. Pensions are then taxed as other
income, subject to a lower rate of tax on small incomes. If a German
employer does establish a segregated fund, the employee will be liable for
tax on contributions made on his or her behalf. Such funds are corre-
spondingly rare.
Although the French and German institutional arrangements are
rather different from those in most countries, they fit into the group
of countries including Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the
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United States for which the only significant source of tax revenue from
pensions is the taxation of pensions in payment. The United States does
deny relief to employee contributions to defined benefit plans, but the
consequence is that there are few employee contributions.
Despite their long histories, and widely varying institutions, the taxa-
tion arrangements for private pensions in the OECD have much in com-
mon. Yet there are many calls for reform, and some countries have al-
ready implemented quite dramatic change. In the following section we
consider the possible objectives for a pensions tax regime, and the feasi-
bility of achieving them.
Objectives for the Tax System
Many considerations seem to lie behind attempts to review the tax treat-
ment of savings in general, and private pensions in particular. One is the
concern for fiscal neutrality, the desire to achieve a tax structure that as
far as possible avoids discrimination between different kinds of activity
and that leaves choices unaffected by tax considerations. A second is a
desire to raise revenue by eliminating subsidies to particular activities
that take the form offavorable tax treatment rather than explicit items of
public expenditure. A third is concern about the aggregate level of sav-
ing. And in developing and transitional economies, questions are often
raised about the most appropriate form ofsavings taxation.
There is no feasible tax regime that both raises revenue and is fiscally
neutral in all aspects. Taxes inevitably distort economic behavior; so the
best we can do is remove unnecessary deviations from neutrality and
choose those that are least damaging in their overall economic effect.
Two kinds of incentive are particularly important in considering the tax
treatment of pension funds. One is the incentive to save rather than
consume. The second is the choice of the form in which to save. We
consider each kind of incentive in turn. There are two ways of interpret-
ing fiscal neutrality in relation to the decision to save. We might seek to
be neutral between consumption and savings, or we might seek to be
neutral between present and future consumption. Neutrality between
consumption and savings is achieved by a comprehensive income tax on
real income of all types. Whatever the source of revenue, whether it be
from work or from savings, and whether it is consumed or saved, it is
taxed in the same way and at the same rate. This approach appears to be
gathering support, as evidenced by the reforms in Australia and New
Zealand, and by debates throughout the OECD. However, it is worth
noting that there are peculiarities associated with this approach. With a
comprehensive income tax (lTE in our earlier discussion), savings are
treated as if they are simply another commodity, akin to consumption.
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But people do not, in the main, save for saving's own sake; savings are not
a commodity in themselves, but a means to future consumption. In rela-
tion to retirement savings, this perspective is particularly obviously the
appropriate one. The relevant concept of neutrality is not between con-
sumption and savings but between consumption now and consumption
in the future.
It is this neutrality in the impact of the tax system on the decision
between current and future consumption that is achieved by tax systems
of the EET type most common in the OECD. Such systems offer the
alternative of paying now or deferring tax by means of contributing to
private pension plans and paying tax when the benefits are derived. Thus
both present and future consumption are taxed on the same basis. And,
as noted above, the EET regime maintains equality of pre- and post-tax
returns, another reflection of the lack of distortion imposed on the deci-
sion as to whether to consume now or in the future.
The comprehensive income tax, or TIE approach, by contrast, re-
duces future consumption because less is saved as compared to that
would exist in a no tax world; in an inflationary world with nominal
investment income taxed, it could actually impose a penalty on deferred
consumption. Thus, if fiscal neutrality between current and future con-
sumption is desired, the appropriate tax system is an expenditure-type
system along the lines of those commonly used in OECD countries.
The second concept of fiscal neutrality that is of interest to us concerns
the way in which different kinds of savings are taxed. Here, neutrality
demands that all forms of saving be taxed in the same way. If not, more
generously treated forms of saving will tend to attract greater flows of
saving, regardless of their underlying economic efficiency. In general,
different forms ofsaving are taxed very differently in countries across the
OECD.
Although it is hard to make generalizations in this area, two forms of
saving stand out as being conceded relatively favorable tax treatment in
many countries: owner-{)ccupied housing and private pensions. Govern-
ments in the 1980s made many statements to the effect that fiscal neu-
trality between forms of saving was an important goal, but few made
much progress toward it. There were two main reasons. First, although
most statements were in favor of a comprehensive income tax-type treat-
ment, nowhere was any serious attempt made to adjust investment in-
come as well as capital gains for inflation. Second, very few governments
had the courage to remove the "privileges" associated with owner-{)ccu-
pied housing or private pension plans. Part of the reason for lack of
action in this second field was the widespread belief that there are strong
arguments for providing special incentives for private pension provision.
It is to a discussion of these which we now turn.
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Two types of argument are often advanced to defend the special tax
advantages of private pensions: one that pension saving is more impor-
tant than other saving; the second that saving in general should benefit
from tax incentives.
Households save for a variety of reasons. They save in order to re-
distribute income over their lifetime to use it when they are old, sick, or
unemployed, or when young children reduce the family's income and in-
crease its outgoings. They save in order to accumulate assets from which
they may derive benefits (housing services from owner-occupied hous-
ing) or that they might use to establish or develop a business. They may
also save in order to leave money to their children.
It is not immediately easy to see why retirement savings should be
singled out in this list. They are all worthy motives, which is no doubt why,
at one time or another, in one place or another, all have been singled out
for fiscal privilege, although frequently in an uncoordinated manner.
Several possible arguments exist.
First, individuals may fail to perceive accurately their likely needs in old
age, and this failure of perception/information is more serious here
than in other areas. It would be plausible to argue that this could be so
simply because at the beginning of the period when saving for retirement
might make sense, old age can seem very distant. This is a basically pater-
nalistic argument that asserts that governments know better than their
people what is good for them and should distort choices using the tax
system in an attempt to correct the deficiencies of individual preferences.
A second argument for singling out retirement savings is that they can
be particularly significant in reducing other forms of state expenditure.
If individuals fail to save for their old age, the state will have to provide
incomes for them during that period. Certainly in most countries at least
a part of the social security system that supports the elderly pays benefits
that are related to income. If governments can encourage more people
to save for their retirement, and also those who already are saving to save
more, expenditure on means-tested benefits to the retired would fall.
The importance of this argument will obviously vary from country to
country.
A third argument might be that private pension plans are superior to
other financial intermediaries. This could relate either to their invest-
ment performance or to the broader social and economic implications of
their investment policies. Although this is a possible argument, it is not
one that has been put forward much, and it is difficult to give it much
weight, not least because in many instances private pension funds are
organized by financial intermediaries engaged in a wide range of busi-
ness other than the provision of pensions.
There is no suggestion that private pensions are anything other than a
222 Taxation of Private Pensions
TABLE 3 Household Savings Rates as Percentage of Disposable
Household Income
Country
United States
United Kingdom
Australia
Japan
Germany
SoUTce: DilnotandJohnson (1993).
1988
4.5
5.7
6.5
14.3
12.8
1993
4.6
11.5
4.2
14.6
12.1
desirable thing, and there are some arguments for particularly favorable
tax treatment for them. The strength of these arguments depends on the
extent to which pension saving would fall in the absence of any special
privilege. The recent experience in New Zealand is the best evidence
available on lhis. Thus far there are insufficient data to draw firm conclu-
sions, although there does seem to have been some move away from
employer-provided pension. If it is the case that pension saving falls if tax
treatment is made less generous, the important issue for policymakers is
determining the most appropriate form in which to provide some incen-
tive for pension saving.
The remaining argument for tax incentives for pensions relates to the
overall level of saving. Across much of the OECD there is concern that
savings rates are too low. The United States, United Kingdom, and Aus-
tralia would be obvious examples, while in countries like Japan and Ger-
many such a problem seems not to exist. Table 3 illustrates the diversity of
personal savings rates. One of the longest-running debates in applied
economics has been the extent to which new tax incentives for saving in a
particular form will increase the overall level of saving. It is clear from the
experience ofRegistered Retirement Savings Plans in Canada, Individual
Retirement Accounts in the United States, and Personal Pensions in the
United Kingdom, for example (Carroll and Summers 1987, Venti and
Wise 1986; National Audit Office 1991, respectively), and the popularity
of private pension saving in general, that new or existing generous tax
regimes for certain types of saving can be enormously "successful," if we
measure success only in terms of amounts of money flowing into the
favored regime.
Such a measure of success is of little interest. Of course, tax incentives
for saving in a certain form will attract funds. We need to know what
impact this has on funds held in, and flowing into, other forms ofsaving,
and the impact of the new scheme on government tax revenue, since if
we are concerned about any measure of saving it is national saving, which
includes public sector saving, not simply personal sector saving.
Andrew Dllnot 223
It would be quite possible for a new savings incentive to appear to be
successful while in fact reducing both personal sector saving and public
sector saving. and thus diminishing national saving (Munnell 1982) . Ifwe
started from a world in which individuals had a relatively fixed demand
for an income level in retirement, but in which savings were harshly
treated by the tax system, the introduction oftax incentives would allow a
reduction in current savings without any reduction in the level of retire-
ment income, thus reducing the level of personal sector saving. At the
same time, since the tax incentive would reduce tax revenue, public
sector saving would fall.
There has been a great deal of empirical work using microeconomic
data to attempt to provide conclusive evidence on the likely effect of tax
incentives. This is an extremely difficult area, since the data require-
ments are very severe: complete answers would require detailed informa-
tion on all assets, incomes, preferences, and expectations for a large
sample of individuals over a long period. To the extent that there is a
consensus, it seems to be that tax incentives can increase personal saving,
and that after taking account of the reduction in tax revenue there may
be a small increase in national saving (Bovenberg 1989; Feenberg and
Skinner 1989; Feldstein 1992; Poterba, Venti, and Wise 1993; Venti and
Wise 1987, for some representative views). Some, however (e.g., Gravelle
1991), cast doubt that even a small increase in national saving occurs.
These results are still debated, and would tend to vary enormously from
country to country as a function of the nature of the tax system and the
determinants ofsaving. Certainly differences in tax systems can go only a
little way toward explaining cross-country variation in saving.
All too often, it is simply assumed that more saving is a good thing, and
that the tax system imposed on pensions is an effective and appropriate
way ofachieving a change in the level of national saving. Even ifwe accept
that there is some argument for higher saving, it is not obvious that
tinkering with the tax system is a good way of raising national saving. But
it does seem reasonable to assert that we would not want a tax system that
imposed a post-tax rate of return on deferred consumption lower than
the pre-tax return. If our concern is not to depress saving. then we must
expect to impose a tax treatment for saving in general and for pensions in
particular that does not tax the return to saving. Starting from a tax
system that does tax the return to some or all forms of saving, moving to
one that taxes the return to fewer or no form of saving might increase
national savings. But the taxation of savings in most developed countries
is enormously variable (OECD 1984) with some forms of saving having a
post-tax rate of return higher than the pre-tax rate and some far lower
than the pre-tax rate. Consequently, confident prediction in this area is
very difficult.
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One problem with the common EET/ expenditure tax treatment is the
cash flow implication for government. While for a mature scheme and
economy the deferral of tax payment until retirement is not too great a
problem, in a young or developing economy such a scheme might cause
problems. Given this, a TEE-type scheme may be preferable in such cir-
cumstances, providing an earlier payment of tax where governments may
genuinely be constrained. Such a scheme also has the advantage that
government revenue is not vulnerable to emigration prior to retirement.
Schemes of this kind have been attracting more attention in recent years
(Munnell 1992).
Increased Revenue from Pensions?
As tax reform gathered momentum in the second half of the 1980s, a
common theme of "broadening the base and lowering the rate" could be
discerned in much of the debate about what to do, and much of the
description ofwhat was done, although perhaps not so clearly in what was
done. This objective seemed to imply changes in the taxation of pensions
with a view to raising more revenue, which could be used to cut tax rates.
As we have already noted, some countries have already moved in this
direction, and many others seem to be considering the option.
Starting from a tax treatment of the EET type, there are three areas in
which changes could be made in an attempt to raise more revenue: the
taxation of contributions, the taxation of pension funds themselves, and
the taxation of benefits paid out. We examine each in turn.
The Taxation of Contributions
One seemingly obvious way of raising revenue from taxing pensions is to
give no relief, or only limited relief, to employees for contributions to
pension plans. Such relief could be abolished where it exists, or restricted
to a low rate of tax, or be subjected to a maximum. Yet it would be
pointless to make such a change without simultaneously reviewing the tax
treatment of employer contributions. Indeed, it seems inevitable that all
forms ofcontributions to pension funds be given identical tax treatment.
If not, employees, employers, and pension funds will so arrange their
affairs as to make all contributions in the most tax-efficient manner. The
losers in such a position will be the ill advised, or those unable to take
advantage of the most lightly taxed route. As we noted earlier, the general
non-exemption of employee contributions in the United States means
that very few employee contributions are made, not that large amounts of
tax are raised.
If employees' contributions are to be subject to tax, it seems that em-
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ployers' contributions must also be. There are few practical problems in
subjecting employees' contributions to tax; tax due would simply be cal-
culated on income inclusive of contributions rather than exclusive of
them. Difficulties do arise in the case of employers' contributions, how-
ever. In principle, contributions made by employers on behalf of their
employees would be treated as a benefit to the employee, and taxed as
income of the employee. This causes no problem where employers' con-
tributions are clearly defined and linked to particular individuals, but
difficulties arise in the much more common procedure where an em-
ployer makes general contributions to a fund related to aggregate pay-
roll. Here the task of allocating the employer's contributions to em-
ployees is challenging. One possibility is simply to require employers to
attribute general contributions to individual employees, but this would
not be easy to implement.
An alternative would be to levy tax on employees who are members of
defined benefit schemes on the value of their pension rights, rather than
on contributions. Contributions to defined benefit schemes would re-
main tax-deductible, but the benefit in kind in the form of increased
pension rights would be taxable. This route requires an answer to the
question of what the value of the rights is; valuing such rights may be at
least as difficult as allocating general contributions. Valuation is espe-
cially hard where the final pension is a function of years of employment
and final salary. It is also worth noting that rights within pension plans are
frequently defined quite narrowly, with pensions paid frequently far ex-
ceeding rights. If tax authorities imposed a tax on the annual increase in
the value of an individual's pension rights, it is easy to imagine that such
righ ts would very soon be all but replaced by discretionary payments. The
alternative of trying to tax as income the expected value of discretionary
payments many years in the future is not a task that would appeal to many
revenue authorities.
The problems outlined above are not insuperable; the difficulties of
taxing general unallocated contributions, for example, can be dealt with,
as in New Zealand, by imposing a flat rate tax. This solution is reasonably
fair if most taxpayers face the same marginal income tax rate, and some-
what inequitable in countries with multiple-rate income taxes. And al-
though calculating the value of accrued pension rights is hard, we must
remember that such calculations are already made, for example, to deter-
mine transfer values. If a country is determined to tax pension contribu-
tions, it can certainly be done.
If there is no tax relieffor pension contributions, then it is inappropri-
ate to tax the whole of any pensions in payment as income, since part
would already have been taxed. The easiest solution to this, adopted by
New Zealand, is to tax the income of pension funds as well, making any
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further taxation of pensions in payment unnecessary. But if the income
of funds is not to be taxed, full exemption from tax of pensions in pay-
ment produces a TEE regime equivalent in impact to the EET regime,
although with the timing of tax payments advanced. lEthe aim is to move
to a system that raises more revenue, without taxing contributions twice,
rules to distinguish between the underlying contributions and the return
on them would be needed, so that only the previously untaxed elements
would be taxed. These rules would probably be quite complex, and inev-
itably cause some distortions. The Australian system, which imposes par-
tial tax on contributions, fund income, and benefits illustrates some of
the problems.
The Taxation of Fund Income
Taxing fund income is an alternative (or additional) route to ralsmg
revenue from pensions schemes. There is no obvious lack of logic in a
system that taxes both contributions and fund income, as is done in New
Zealand, although pensions in payment should then be relieved of tax. If
not, pension funds would suffer a substantial fiscal disadvantage relative
to other means of saving, and could be expected to decline rapidly in
popularity and importance.
If the problems with taxing contributions outlined above are thought
to rule out such a regime, the alternative of taxing fund assets or income
while leaving contributions untaxed and benefits taxed is also open. This
is the type of system that operates inJapan, although with a very low rate
of tax. There is an apparent element of double taxation in a procedure
that taxes the income of funds as it is received or their assets and imposes
tax again when benefits are paid out. But it is the same element ofdouble
taxation that is intrinsic to the taxation of income in general, where both
the capital and the returns on capital are taxed.
Iffund income is to be taxed, a decision as to the rate at which it is to be
charged is needed. The most obvious candidate is the marginal tax rate
of the majority of members of the scheme, provided that this majority is a
large one. If there is a wide divergence of tax rates among scheme mem-
bers, then any single tax rate will inevitably be unfair, but the problems of
attempting to allocate fund income to specific individuals and then tax it
at their marginal tax rate seem likely to be too great to consider such a
route seriously.
Perhaps the greatest problem in this area is designing a system that
deals properly with inflation, since a system that taxes full nominal in-
come will be very vulnerable to inflation. In New Zealand and Australia
no adjustment is made to fund income to account for inflation, produc-
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ing a position where at high inflation rates the post-tax rate of return
can become negative. This clearly makes little sense, but the difficulties
of adjusting income for inflation would be very great. The area that is
most frequently chosen for the attempt to adjust for inflation is capital
gains; many OECD countries now have capital gains taxes that adjust for
inflation.
The combination of taxing full nominal fund income and taxing real
capital gains in the fund, as in Australia, provides a strong bias to the
fund in favor ofassets producing capital gain rather than regular income,
and this bias is a function of the rate of inflation, being stronger the
higher the rate of inflation becomes. This sort of distortion will tend to
affect the portfolio behavior of funds, and is clearly undesirable.
One further problem in this area relates to the way in which such a tax
could be introduced if it did not already exist. One possible transition
mechanism would be to close all existing schemes to new contributions,
and allow these schemes to continue to accumulate tax free income and
payout taxable pensions. New contributions would go into new funds
with taxable incomes. Such a transition would be challenging for pension
funds, actuaries and tax authorities, but ought to be possible. An alterna-
tive route would simply be to subject fund income to a relatively low rate
to begin with, reflecting the large share in the fund of "old" contribu-
tions, perhaps increasing the rate steadily over time.
The Taxation of Pension Benefits
As already noted, the main form of taxation levied on the activities of
private pensions in the OECD is of benefits in payment. While it is true
that if contributions and/or fund income are taxed, it is not necessarily
appropriate that all benefits be taxed; where relief exists for contribu-
tions, there is a strong case for taxing benefits.
The most significant area for debate over the taxation of benefits is the
appropriate treatment oflump sum payments. In several countries (Aus-
tralia, Ireland,Japan, and the United Kingdom, for example), lump sum
payments are taxed more leniently than pensions. Given our belief that
all forms of contribution to private pensions should be taxed in the same
way, we might expect to believe that all forms of withdrawal should be
taxed in the same way.
Two arguments in support of preferential tax treatment for lump sums
are frequently advanced. The first is that such provisions are an ac-
cepted part of the regimes where they exist, and therefore should not be
changed. This is a weak argument; although it is vital to avoid too great a
disruption to established expectations, and thus avoid too dramatic a
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change for those approaching retirement, we cannot accept the status
quo simply because that is what it is.
The second argument relates to personal capital accumulation and
general capital formation and suggests that the availability of tax-free
lump sums may encourage this. It is certainly the case that private capital
accumulation may stimulate enterprise and risk taking in the economy.
But a relief whose receipt is conditional on reaching retirement age
seems somewhat inappropriate if this is the aim. There are arguments for
supporting retirement savings, but these do not imply encouraging lump
sum provisions - rather the reverse. There may be arguments for encour-
aging the accumulation of capital sums by individuals, but not especially
individuals past retirement age - rather the reverse.
There seem to be no very strong reasons for treating the lump sum
more favorably than pension payments for tax purposes. Iflump sums are
taxed, the question ofwhether they should be taxed in the year of receipt
becomes relevant. Once more, the question is unimportant in a single-
rate income tax, but significant with a graduated tax system. Under a
graduated system, any lump sum might attract a marginal rate of tax well
in excess of the recipient's expected average marginal tax rate during
retirement. One possibility would be an averaging provision, but it could
also be argued that the disincentive to lump sums caused by graduation
was appropriate, and should be allowed to stay.
Most countries could raise more revenue from private pensions than
they do at present. However, serious problems are associated with taxing
ofboth contributions and fund income: it is not an accident that neither
are taxed in most regimes. The one area where increased taxation seems
appropriate in many countries is lump sum benefits, but even here, en-
trenched expectations may make raising more revenue quickly difficult.
Tax Expenditures
The last two decades have seen growing interest in the concept of tax
expenditures (Surrey 1973; OECD 1984). Many countries now publish
lists of tax expenditures, or lists that are widely thought ofor described as
being of tax expenditures, and a growing number produce such figures
for the tax treatment of private pensions. These figures are widely used in
the debate over tax reform, but merit rather more critical analysis than is
often given them.
According to Willis and Hardwick (1978), a "tax expenditure is an
exemption or relief which is not part of the essential structure of the tax
in question but has been introduced into the tax code for some extra-
neous reason - e.g. in order to ease the burden for a particular class of
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taxpayers, or to provide an incentive to apply income in a particular way,
or perhaps to simplify administration. The term is used to cover, not
merely specific exemption but also gaps in the charge as a result ofwhich
receipts ... are not subject to tax."
The most obvious problem with the concept of tax expenditures, as is
made clear above, is the complete subjectivity on which they are based in
the case of items such as private pensions, because of the difficulty in
deciding on the "essential structure" of the tax system. Ifwe believe that
the essential structure of the tax system is or should be an expenditure
tax, we will argue that tax expenditures on private pensions are in general
relatively small, being mainly the common relief for lump sum payments
and, in cases such as Australia and New Zealand, negative. If, on the other
hand, we are advocates of the comprehensive income tax, we will believe
that tax expenditures on private pensions are in general very substantial.
In the United Kingdom, for example, taking an expenditure tax as the
base implies a tax expenditure of less than 0.1 percent of GOP, while
using an income tax unadjusted for inflation as the base implies a tax
expenditure around 0.7 percent of GDP (Dilnot and Johnson, 1993).
These arguments, very appropriately, point us back toward the realiza-
tion that the crucial debate is over the aims and structure of the whole tax
system as it affects saving.
Even if we can come to some agreement over the "essential structure"
of the tax system, the task of calculating the tax expenditures associated
with private pensions is a very difficult one. It makes very little sense, as is
too often done, to assume that we can change the tax system without
changing behavior as a result. At a very simple level, if we move from a
system where contributions are free of tax to one where they are taxed,
either gross contributions must rise or the size of the fund and subse-
quent benefits will fal1. 2 Either way, there will be some loss of tax to offset
the tax gained from taxing contributions. If gross contributions rise,
company taxes will fall if the contributions are from employers, and taxes
on consumption will fall if the contributions are from employees. If the
size of the fund and subsequent benefits decline, both income and con-
sumption taxes paid by benefit recipients will fall, social security benefits
paid to the retired will rise, and to the extent that fund income was taxed,
that source ofrevenue will also decline.
More important than this, and even more difficult to quantify, is the
extent to which a less favorable treatment for private pensions would lead
individuals to switch their saving to other forms. If we imagine a tax
regime in which private pensions are the most tax privileged form of
saving, but in which other forms of saving are only marginally less priv-
ileged, it is easy to see that a major increase in the tax burden on private
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pensions would probably lead to dramatic switching of savings flows to
the previously marginally less privileged form of saving, resulting in very
little additional revenue to the government.
Any sensible measure of the tax expenditure associated with a given tax
regime for private pensions requires a clear view of the overall objectives
of the tax system, of the likely impact of any change in the tax system on
employee and employer contributions, the size of pension funds, the
composition and level of their income, the level of benefits, the likely
extent of switching to different savings vehicles or to consumption, and
the tax revenue and public expenditure consequences of all of these.
This long list of difficulties is not meant to suggest that the concept of
tax expenditure is without interest or value. It is important that those who
argue for concessions through the tax system should provide estimates of
the cost of such concessions that can be compared to alternative means
of support. But in the field of private pensions, producing an informative
estimate of tax expenditures is likely to be possible only when we have
achieved a clear idea of the aims and effects of the tax system. Measures of
tax expenditure that ignore the arguments set out above may well do
more harm than good.
Conclusion
Finding an appropriate tax system for private pensions is not easy, and
cannot be done without considering the rest of a country's tax system,
especially as it affects saving. Much of the interest in this area has been a
result of the belief that substantial extra revenue could be raised here. It
may be possible to raise some additional revenue without major disloca-
tion, but significant increases in taxation may not be desirable from all
points of view, will inevitably be difficult, will lead to much behavioral
change, and should not be seen as an easy answer to anything. It is no
accident that the basic form of pensions tax regime that is most common
is the EET type, for which there is a strong economic case.
Notes
'On comprehensive income taxation, see Carter Commission (1966). On ex-
penditure taxes see Kaldor (1955), Andrews (1974), and US Treasury (1977),
and Pechman (1980).
'The United Kingdom authorities, for example, note that their estimates of the
costs of tax allowances and reliefs "make no allowance for the fact that changes in
tax reliefs may cause people to change their behavior. For example, removing the
tax privileges of one form of saving may lead people to switch to another tax
privileged form of saving" (HMSO 1992).
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Comments by Angela E. Chang
The chapter by Andrew Dilnot reviews the tax treatment of pensions in a
number of developed countries and lays out several issues that deserve
further discussion and research. l In reviewing the favorable tax treatment
of pensions in 14 countries, the chapter focuses on common "themes"
observed in the various countries. For example, the form in which pen-
sions receive favorable tax treatment is similar across the countries. Favor-
able tax treatment is granted to one or more of the following transactions
that occur as related to pensions:
• tax-deductible contributions to the pension plans, by employers and/
or employees;
• tax-exempt earnings from investment of the pension funds; and
• tax-exempt payment of retirement benefits from the pension funds.
Another common theme concerns the motivation for granting favor-
able tax treatment to pensions. Dilnot discusses several possible motivat-
ing factors that may have led policymakers in these countries to grant the
specific favorable tax treatment that we observe, such as a desire to raise
the aggregate level of savings and to reduce the financial burden on
social security programs.
Lastly, in several countries, the value of favorable tax treatment of
pensions is becoming the subject of increasing policy debate in light of
the desire for fiscal restraint in these countries. The debate is about
whether the benefits from encouraging pensions outweigh the cost of the
foregone tax revenue. In particular, if the favorable tax treatment of
pensions is curtailed, would that cause national saving to fall? This is a
question about the sensitivity of pension decisions to taxes.
There is substantial literature about the tax sensitivity of individuals'
contributions to pensions, so I will briefly discuss what we have learned
from the literature. Research in this area has concentrated on individ-
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uals' contributions to individual retirement-saving vehicles, such as IRAs
and40I(k)s.
Several studies on IRAs (Feenberg and Skinner 1989, Venti and Wise
1990) and 401 (k)s (Poterba, Venti, and Wise 1993) indicate that saving in
these instruments does not "crowd out" other forms ofsaving, suggesting
that an increase in IRA or 401 (k) saving raises personal saving. There is
also evidence that the increase in personal saving associated with IRAs
outweighs the foregone tax revenue (Feldstein 1992). This suggests that
curtailing the favorable tax treatment of these vehicles may diminish
national saving.
In contrast to the substantial literature on the impact of taxes on indi-
viduals' contribution to pension plans, there has been little research
about the following issues:
• tax sensitivity of pension contributions by firms;
• tax sensitivity of the investment of pension funds; and
• the effects of the taxes imposed on the payment of pension benefits,
particularly the tax treatment oflump sum distributions.
Let me expand on the discussion of areas for future research be-
yond the issues mentioned in Chapter 7. An interesting explanation has
emerged from the literature about the tax sensitivity of individuals' sav-
ing decisions - that individuals may not always make saving decisions
based on rational utility maximization. For example, one explanation for
the high participation rates in 401 (k)s is that the payroll deductions of
401 (k) contributions serve as a self-control mechanism. Several econo-
mists (e.g., Thaler 1990) are exploring the importance of self-control
factors, rules of thumb, mental accounting, and other behavioral models
of saving decision.
Another thought-provoking observation concerns the 10 percent tax
penalty on pre-retirement lump sum distributions that are not rolled
over into IRAs or other tax-deferred instruments. Congress imposed this
tax penalty in 1986, anticipating to raise little tax revenue from it. For
1987-89, Congress expected to raise about US$ 500 million in tax reve-
nue from the tax penalty. The actual tax receipt from the tax penalty
during the period was over US$ 1.8 billion.
One explanation for the low impact of the tax penalty on rollovers is
liquidity constrain ts. Many more individuals may be Iiquidity-constrained
than expected, such that they spent their lump sum distributions even
though they paid the 10 percent tax penalty (Chang 1993).
Thus, while more data in terms of quality and quantity would further
our knowledge about the tax sensitivity of individuals' saving decisions as
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regards pensions, refining the economic framework to take account of
the possibility of individuals' using self-control mechanisms and rules
of thumb to make saving decisions and the possibility of liquidity con-
straints may also produce important insights. Finally, until we have an
adequate economic framework and sufficiently accurate data, it would be
premature to answer one way or the other that curtailing the favorable
tax treatment of pensions will raise national saving.
The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the official position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the
Board of Governors, or the Federal Reserve System.
References
Chang, Angela E. "Tax Policy, Lump Sum Pension Distributions, and Household
Saving." Unpublished PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy,1993.
Dilnot, Andrew. "The Taxation of Private Pensions." This volume.
Feenberg, Daniel and Jonathan Skinner. "Sources of IRA Savings." In Lawrence
Summers, ed., Tax Policy and 1M Economy 1989. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1989: 25-46.
Feldstein, Martin. "The Effects of Tax-Based Saving Incentives on Government
Revenue and National Saving." Cambridge, MA: NBER Working Paper 4021,
1992.
Poterba, James M., Steven Venti, and David Wise. "Do 401 (k) Contributions
Crowd Out Other Personal Saving?" Cambridge, MA: NBER Working Paper
4391,1993.
Thaler, Richard. "Anomalies: Savings, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts." Journal
ofEconomic Perspectives 4, 1 (1990): 193-206.
Venti, Steven and David Wise. "Have IRAs Increased U.S. Savings: Evidence from
Consumer Expenditure Surveys." Q:1arterly Journal of Economics 105 (1990):
661-98.
Comments by SylvesterJ Schieber
Andrew Dilnot's chapter presents a concise analytical framework for as-
sessing the implications of alternative tax treatments of pension savings.
This framework is used to show how the alternative timing of taxation of
contributions to plans, income accruing to plan assets, and benefit pay-
ments under pension plans results in a variety of tax and benefit out-
comes. He employs the framework to show how several of the major
economies represented in the OECD tax pension accruals. He assesses
the overall objectives for a taxing system and some of the dilemmas that
these systems pose relative to pension design and sponsorship. He dis-
cusses the governmental revenue issues that are pushing some, if not
all, of the countries he covers in his analysis to reevaluate their tax treat-
ment of pension plans. He informs us that another of the United States'
great cultural creations, tax expenditures, has spread like Mickey Mouse
and the Golden Arches around the world. Finally, he leaves us with
the conclusion that increases in the taxation of pensions relative to the
traditional treatment accorded them in most countries "may not be de-
sirable from all points of view, will inevitably be difficult, will lead to
much behavioral change, and should not be seen as an easy answer to
anything."
I like Dilnot's chapter, though having said this, I believe it has two
shortcomings. The first shortcoming is that I believe the chapter fails
to probe deeply the countervailing policy tensions that persist between
the motivations for pension and retirement policy, on one hand, and, on
the other hand, analysts who argue that the comprehensive income tax is
the appropriate base by which to assess pension policy. The second short-
coming is that Dilnot's presentation is incomplete, not in its broad and
analytical framework, but in the detailing ofpension outcomes that result
from alternative taxing policies. Before I turn to these two points specifi-
cally, I feel compelled to address an issue that Dilnot raises in his analysis
of the objectives for tax systems.
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Clarifying the Analytical Framework
In assessing the goals ofa taxing system, Dilnot looks at their treatment of
consumption and savings and the desirability minimizing distorting be-
havior. He states that "neutrality between consumption and savings is
achieved by a comprehensive income tax on real income of all types."
While this statement is true, its misapplication in the development of the
concept of tax expenditures accorded pensions in many countries and in
the development of pension policy in others must be understood. The
problem is that the actual application of the concept that Dilnot so sim-
ply states generally ignores that the "neutrality between consumption
and savings is achieved by a comprehensive income tax on rea/income,"
while when operationalized, the analytical models and estimates are gen-
erally derived using nominal rather than real incomes.
In order to understand this point, consider a simple case where there
are no taxes applied against income. In this case, a consumer can enjoy a
level of consumption (C) equal to his or her entire income (Y) in the
time period in which it is earned (P),
Alternatively, the consumer can invest his or her income and earn inter-
est at a rate (i), and enjoy future income as follows:
The consumer can trade off current versus future consumption at the
rate
Under this model, the consumer is paid an interest premium for defer-
ring consumption. The way our income tax system works, an individual is
faced with a slightly different scenario than that laid out in equations
(1)-(3). Under the current federal tax system, ifan individual consumes
current income, taxes have to be paid on that income first. That is,
(4) Cp = (1- t) Yp ,
where t is the income tax rate. Under the IRe provisions favoring retire-
ment plans, workers are faced with the opportunity of saving out of cur-
rent income before taxes, but they have to pay taxes on the amount
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distributed at retirement. In this case, future consumption can be spec-
ified as
(5) GF = (I - I) [Yp(1 + ill.
If a comprehensive income tax is introduced into this world, the special
treatment of retirement plan contributions would no longer be allowed.
Future consumption in this regime is
(6) GF = (I -I) Yp[1 + i(1 - I)].
Under this regime the consumer would trade off current versus future
consumption at the rate
(7) Gp = I
GF 1 + i(1 - I) .
The application of the "comprehensive" income tax to qualified retire-
ment plans would equalize the tax treatment of pension savings with the
tax treatment ofa regular savings account under our tax laws. Comparing
equations (5) and (6) shows that the existence of tax-free earnings for
retirement savings enhances the efficiency of the tax-qualified plan. The
difference between the two is that in the former the effective tax rate on
the interest accruals in the account is zero, but in the latter it would be
the statutory rate.
The problem is that the current measurements of tax expenditures
accorded pensions in the United States are based on the concept of the
comprehensive income tax applied to the nominal income accruing to
pension assets. This approach overlooks the fact that some portion of the
returns on assets over time does not reflect real economic return for
deferring consumption, but rather makes up for the decreased purchas-
ing power of money resulting from price inflation. That is, the interest
rate i in equation (6) above is composed of two elements:
dP(8) i = - + T
P
where P is the price level in the current period and dP is the change in
prices from the current period to the future period, and r is the real rate
of return on assets in excess of inflation. In other words:
(9) Gp = 1
Gp I + (dP / P) (I - I) + T(I - I)
23. Comments
TABLE 1 Relative Value of Money in a Normal Savings Account Paying a Rate
of Return Equivalent to a 5 Percent Inflation Rate and Subject
to 25 Percent Tax Rates
Purchasing
Nominal Power
Value ofSavings Effective
ofConstant Nominal (% of TaxlWte
P"rchasing Value Gross Net anginal 1m Original
Year Power ofSavings Interest Interest earnings) Earnings
0 1,000.00 750.00 37.5 28.1 75.0 25.0
1 1,050.00 778.13 38.9 29.2 74.1 25.9
2 1,102.50 807.30 40.4 30.3 73.2 26.8
3 1,157.63 837.58 4l.9 3l.4 72.4 27.6
4 1,215.51 868.99 43.4 32.6 71.5 28.5
5 1,276.28 901.57 45.1 33.8 70.6 29.4
6 1,340.10 935.38 46.8 35.1 69.8 30.2
7 1,407.10 970.46 48.5 36.4 69.0 31.0
8 1,477.46 1,006.85 50.3 37.8 68.1 31.9
9 1,551.33 1,044.61 52.2 39.2 67.3 32.7
10 1,628.89 1,083.78 54.2 40.6 66.5 33.5
20 2,653.30 1,566.11 78.3 58.7 59.0 41.0
30 4,321.94 2,263.10 113.2 84.9 52.4 47.6
Source: Wyatt Company simulations.
In order for deferred consumption to be at least of equal value lO
present consumption, the rate of return on deferred consumption has to
equal at least the rate of inflation. Since the return defined by the factor
dP/ Pis merely maintaining the purchasing power of income across peri-
ods, taxing that factor subjects income to an added tax if it is not con-
sumed immediately. It is this conception ofa "comprehensive tax" where
the return on assets that covers inflation is taxable that is the theoretical
basis for measuring tax preferences for retirement and savings plans.
Under this model, if there is any inflation at all in the economy, income
deferred for retirement purposes outside a tax-qualified plan is subjected
to a higher tax than ifit is used for immediate consumption purposes.
Using a hypothetical situation where the marginal statutory tax rate is
25 percent and the annual rate of return on assets just equals the infla-
tion rate, Table 1 shows that deferring consumption under this type of
regime results in a gradual deterioration of the purchasing power of
money saved relative to the purchasing power of the income originally
earned. If the earnings are put toward consumption in the year earned,
the taxpayer can consume 75 percent of the value of earnings. If con-
sumption is deferred just one year, the purchasing power of the account
. ·is only 74.1 percent of the value of the initial earnings. This loss in pur-
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TABLE 2 Effective Tax Rates on Current versus Future Consumption When
Consumption Is Deferred through a Regular Savings Account at 5
and 10 Percent Interest and Inflation Rates
Statutary Tax Rate
Consumption TiTlU! FraTlU!
5 Percent Interest and Inflation Rates
Immediate
Mter 10 years
Mter 20 years
Mter 30 years
10 Percent Interest and Inflation Rates
lmrnediate .
Mter 10 years
Mter 20 years
Mter 30 years
Source: Wyatt Company.
25 Percent 33 Percent
25.0 33.0
33.5 42.8
41.0 51.2
47.6 58.3
25.0 33.0
40.4 50.6
52.6 63.6
62.4 73.1
chasing power results because the inflationary return on the asset is
taxed. No added income accrues to the account holder under the as-
sumptions,just added tax because of the decision to defer consumption.
If the savings are held in this environment for 10 years, the effective tax
on the original earnings rises to 33.5 percent. Mter 20 years it is 41.0
percent, and after 30 years it is up to 47.6 percent.
Further analysis of this phenomenon shows that the effective tax rate
on earnings not immediately consumed varies in relation to a number of
factors as shown in Table 2. The results in the table show that the effective
tax rate varies with the underlying statutory tax rate, the duration of time
that consumption is deferred, and the economy's underlying inflation
rate. Under these assumptions, 50 percent goes to keep up with the
eroding purchasing power of money, and 25 percent of the gross interest
goes to pay taxes.The effective yield on the deferred consumption in this
case implies a 50 percent tax on the real return, double the statutory tax
rate assumed in the development of this example. In other words, the
concept of the comprehensive income tax behind the measurement of
tax expenditures related to tax-qualified retirement plans in the United
States would penalize people who deferred consumption during their
working career.
Conflicts Between Pension and Tax Policies
While the measurement of the tax expenditures related to employer-
sponsored retirement plans raises several methodological issues, there is
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an even more fundamental problem with the estimates in that the theo-
retical concept is inconsistent with other stated public policies. Most
governments of developed economies around the world would be reluc-
tant to espouse publicly a national retirement policy that would advo-
cate that retirees should lead reduced standards of living in retirement.
Matching retirement living standards with pre-retirement standards does
not imply that pre-retirement income levels have to be maintained. Re-
tirees no longer have the direct expenses related to an active working life.
If workers help to finance the national retirement scheme through the
payment of payroll taxes, they will no longer be burdened by payroll taxes
after quitting work, and other tax obligations may be reduced as well. If
workers help to finance their own retirement security through steady
savings in either tax-favored or unfavored plans, they will no longer be
required to make such provision in retirement. But after taking into
account all the differentials in expenses related to working relative to
retirement, typical government policy is to encourage, if not provide,
that generally acceptable living standards be attainable in retirement.
Indeed, one of the stated goals of public policy of the United States
federal government, as specified in the Older Americans Act of 1965, is
that the older citizens ofthis nation enjoy "an adequate income in retire-
ment in accordance with the American standard of living."l One of the
problems with the Older Americans Act is that it is not specific about the
levels of income that would satisty "the American standard of living."
There are other conventional measures of adequacy that we might con-
sider in this context, however. At the lower end of the income spectrum
there are absolute measures of adequacy that are implied by the federal
government's official poverty line. At income levels above these minimal-
ist measures, adequacy of retirement income is often measured against
the ability to maintain pre-retirement living standards.
An analysis of the measures usually used to assess the adequacy of
benefits provided through retirement programs shows that most coun-
tries' social security benefits by themselves are inadequate to finance
consumption levels commensurate with generally acceptable standards
of living across a broad range of the income spectrum. This means that,
in order to attain adequate retirement income to sustain acceptable stan-
dards of living, individuals must accumulate other financial resources
during their working careers by deferring consumption until their retire-
ment. This public policy goal is inconsistent with the concept of the
comprehensive income tax and its application to the tax deferrals on re-
tirement plan accumulations in the United States and elsewhere around
the world. If attaining government retirement policy goals implies that
individual workers have to save some of their lifetime wages to help meet
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their own retirement needs, why would government impose a "tax pen-
alty" on them for doing so?
At times, past U.S. federal budget documents submitted to Congress
have been unequivocal in their support of the issues being raised here
regarding the measures of tax expenditures related to retirement savings.
For example, the 1993 Budget observed that decisions on whether spe-
cific provisions of the tax law are preferential exceptions to the baseline
provisions "is a matter ofjudgment."2 The fiscal 1993 budgetary docu-
ment specifically addressed the issue of taxing the inflationary return on
savings. It states: "A comprehensive income tax would adjust the cost
basis of capital assets and debt for changes in the price level during the
time the assets or debt are held. Thus, under a comprehensive income
tax baseline the failure to take account of inflation in measuring ...
interest income would be regarded as a negative tax expenditure (i.e., a
tax penalty)."3
If including the inflation component of interest earnings on retire-
ment assets results in a "negative tax expenditure," it should exactly
offset the positive inflation component of returns on pension assets that
is built into the annual estimates of these tax expenditures included in
the annual federal budgets. In other words, the tax expenditures related
to tax-qualified retirement plans included in the annual federal budget
estimates are not only inconsistent with other federal policy, but are
exaggerated by the amount of inflationary return on assets in all the
respective plans. If the inflationary return on pension assets is not in-
cluded in the calculations, the overall magnitude of the tax preferences
accorded employer-sponsored retirement plans declines significantly.
The Comprehensive Income Tax at Work
Until 1987 New Zealand followed the normal practice of providing tax
deductions for employer and employee contributions to pension plans.
In addition, exemptions from tax on investment income were provided
to the plans. Benefits paid by the plans were taxed on a concessional
basis. The changes introduced in 1987 eliminated the tax deductibility
of employee contributions, subjected employer contributions to a with-
holding tax, and subjected investment income to a tax. The goal of these
changes was to remove all tax incentives for retirement savings and
achieve tax neutrality between all forms of personal savings.
By implementing tax neutrality in this fashion the government actually
subjected any earnings deferred for retirement purposes to much higher
tax rates than if the earnings were used for immediate consumption
purposes as shown earlier. While the new tax structure was neutral be-
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tween savings within an approved retirement scheme versus some other
forms of savings, it was not neutral between income earned and con-
sumed in this period versus income earned in this period but saved for
later consumption. Under this model, the only way to equalize the statu-
tory tax rate on earnings that are saved relative to those that are not is by
reducing the inflation rate in the economy to zero.
In addition to its tax treatment of private pensions, the government of
New Zealand has had another structural problem in regard to its support
of retirement programs. This particular problem has to do with its public
social security program. This program has paid relatively high benefits,
equal to 45 percent ofaverage salaries in the economy for a single individ-
ual living alone. For a retired couple the benefit is approximately 65
percent of the average wage level. These benefit levels suggest that New
Zealand's national retirement program is providing benefits at a level
that would come close to sustaining the pre-retirement living standards
for a significant portion of the workers reaching age 60. The problem
that New Zealand has faced is that it cannot afford benefits at this level of
generosity.
Under the 1991 New Zealand government's budget proposals regard-
ing the move from the guaranteed retirement income (GRI) scheme to a
revised national superannuation scheme, an income test would begin to
tax away the national retirement benefit at incomes above US$ 4,160 for
couples at a rate of a 50-cent reduction in the government benefit for
each additional dollar of employer-provided benefit through a life insur-
ance annuity or from a registered superannuation scheme. If that 50
percent tax rate were to be applied to the nominal value of accumulated
saving in the examples we were discussing earlier, it would basically re-
duce the net real return on savings to zero or negative rates if the asset
were held for any significant period of time. Under this model it is possi-
ble to conceive of easily plausible scenarios where workers would be bet-
ter off burying their retirement savings in a jar in their back yard than
investing them in an approved retirement scheme. From a macroeco-
nomic policy perspective, encouraging people to bury their retirement
savings in jars should be discouraged.
As of 1994, the budget proposal outlined by the government during
1991 has not been implemented because of the concerns voiced about it.
The revised phase-out arrangement, which applied from April 1992, pro-
vides for a reduction in national superannuation by 25 percent of each
dollar' earned in excess of US$ 4,160 for single .people and US$ 6,240 for
couples. Only 50 percent of benefits paid by registered superannuation
schemes and annuities paid by life offices are included in the phase-out
calculation because the balance is, in effect, deemed to be a repayment of
the earnings originally contributed to the plan.
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A further complicating and distorting element of the New Zealand tax
law is that housing continues to receive preferable tax treatment. If the
goal is tax neutrality, then the preferential treatment of housing is inap-
propriate. While tax neutrality may be the stated goal for the current tax
treatment of some forms of wealth accumulation, the inconsistency with
which it is being applied undoubtedly will distort behavior.
Notes
'Public Law 89-73, USC.
'Budget ... Fiscal Year, 1993, Part Two. p. 23.
'Ibid.
